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By borrowing an ad hoc concept ‘diamond stage’ uttered by Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Croatia in April 2019 to 
describe a new stage in Sino-Croatian bilateral relations, this 
article sets to analyse the reasons behind this flattering diplomatic 
designation. It departs from the context of weak, historically distant 
and asymmetrical Sino-Croatian cooperation (SCC), giving, firstly, a 
short account on historical relations between China and Croatia and, 
secondly, relying on small state power scholarship in IR, depicting 
the opening and advancing of SCC. While categories of state size, 
geographical proximity, bilateral history and relational capacity are 
relatively pointless given the previous track of SCC, the dynamics of 
decreasing asymmetry between a small state and a big power helps 
to understand the recent upcoming of a new, ‘diamond’ stage in 
bilateral relations.  Therefore, the article proposes several features as 
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Introduction  
As a small regional power entering the world stage relatively 
recently, Croatian foreign policy experts tended to regard the 
development of bilateral relations with “extra-European” 
countries with a more reductionist perspective and passive 
stance. Sino-Croatian relations were not an exception to 
this. The scope of bilateral relations was thus regarded as 
almost one-sidedly stemming from the dynamics of Chinese 
foreign political initiatives, and bilateral developments were 
considered as a variable depending on the Chinese involvement 
in European affairs and regional economic cooperation – 
but rarely vice versa. Since Chinese foreign policy activity in 
Southeast Europe was for a long time considered minimal, Sino-
Croatian relations consequently were also deemed minimal in 
a political, economic and social sense, until the launch of the 
Chinese FP initiatives towards Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE) prompted a new development in Sino-Croatian 
cooperation (SCC). 
This article departs from the context of weak, historically 
distant and asymmetrical SCC, giving, firstly, a short account 
on historical relations between China and Croatia and, 
secondly, relying on small state power scholarship in IR, 
depicting the opening and advancing of SCC. While categories 
of state size, geographical proximity, bilateral history 
and relational capacity are relatively pointless given the 
previous track of SCC, the dynamics of decreasing asymmetry 
between a small state and a big power helps to understand 
the recent upcoming of a new, “diamond” stage in bilateral 
relations. Therefore, departing from a constructivist reading 
of asymmetric relations between small and big powers, this 
article examines asymmetric features in SCC and Croatian 
ability to decrease bilateral asymmetry with the big power 
by using its derivative powers, creating avenues of influence 
and increasing its chances for a reciprocal transaction with a 
stronger bilateral partner. Thus, the thesis aims to answer the 
following research question: Does Croatia have the capacity to 
decrease bilateral asymmetry with the big power by using its 
derivative powers? Building on this thesis, central features in 
the current stage of SCC can provide an alternative reading 
to more “realist” approaches in conceptualising Croatian 
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Power in international relations has long been used within 
the realist terms of reference as an “intrinsic power” (Copeland 
2000: 6); with population, territory, GDP, military strength, 
and trade being intrinsic or inherent to a state qua big power. 
While there is no agreed-upon list of these criteria, based on 
the estimates of these factors, states are usually understood as 
pertaining or lacking what (it) makes (to become) a great power. 
Small states, on the other hand, lack many of the “normal” 
categories of power but can be endowed with those forms of 
power particularly salient within the multilateral world (Dahl 
1957: 201-206). According to scholars departing from the realist 
framework, small states may derive power by convincing larger 
states to take actions that boost their interests. If one accepts 
that power is relational, a small state utilising access to the 
other state or the supra-state’s FP deliberation and formation 
may derive power that can vary according to the small state’s 
goals and its relationship with the great power (Risse-Kappen 
1995: 198–206). The said has often been seen as the primary 
option for small states in post-WWII Europe but is particularly 
relevant in the contemporary EU fora. Described by Keohane 
(1971) as “the big influence of small allies”, a small state can 
help a bigger one to achieve a significant goal, for a significant 
price. It can derive the base of its power that would be rooted in 
structural, not material, aspects (Shoemaker and Spanier 1984: 
17–18). Small states may reconstitute a relationship in ways that 
make their cooperation valuable not only through strategic or 
material but also through ideological and relational means. 
Scholarship on the power of small states developed three 
categories that correspond to the ability （power（ of a small state 
to shape its relations with big powers, i.e. intrinsic, derivative 
and collective. Particular-intrinsic power that Croatia 
possesses in terms of material resources, strategic location or 
other ideational resources (institutional power or "normative 
capital" in pursuing international relations), which constitute 
a potential base of its power with other big powers, is arguably 
not as important in its relations with China. On the other hand, 
collective power understood as deriving its fundamental base of 
power from the relationship between small powers or "a small 
state with associated non-great powers" (Long 2017: 14) might 
find application in Croatian participation in the FP initiative 
17+1 or other regional framework seeking convergence or 
alliance in the relations with China. However, since these 
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sponsored initiative is not showing much signs of genuine 
multilateralism beyond mere "multitude of bilateralisms" 
(Bakota 2016: 13), this kind of power is also inviting scepticism 
regarding the ability of the countries within the "cluster of 
17" to forge alliance vis-à-vis China.1 Derivative power, as we 
understand it, is any “other-conditioned” (Handel 1981: 257) 
base of power that may influence the big power in taking the 
course of action in favour of the small state’s interests. It can 
thus mean a diplomatic art of the small state to lobby or in other 
way influence a desirable policy or objective of the big power or 
any third party that might be useful in its relations with the big 
power. Nevertheless, it can also be applicable in a way the small 
state is using the opportunity given by the big power balance to 
advance its interests. The latter might be particularly relevant 
for the ‘diamond stage’ in SCC.  
While China as a big power mostly engages in asymmetric 
bilateral relationships often seen as leading a partner country 
into a deeper dependence, when engaging in the relations 
with historically distant countries such as Croatia, it is hardly 
a case of complex structural interdependence. As the power 
that is an arriviste on a global stage, China is often structurally 
incapacitated for more non-material (non-intrinsic) exercises 
of power, primarily directed towards distant global regions. 
Therefore, critical scholars would argue that by lacking 
relational power and structural interdependence, China has to 
allocate intrinsic capacities to decrease (power) asymmetry in 
bilateral relationships, or, more concretely and a bit simplified, 
trade in preferential trade and economic agreements for 
political support. This forcible dissymmetry affects both 
interests and agendas of Chinese FP and shapes bilateral 
dynamics of CEE countries with China. It might also be argued 
from the nexus of realist and constructivist standpoints that 
China is thus more prone to decrease intrinsic asymmetry in 
1 This is not to preclude the possibility of a theoretical approach seeking to assess CEE`s 
“collective power” with respect to China. During the short history of 17+1 cooperation, 
there were occasions when some CEE countries engaged in a group to negotiate more 
favourable rules and procedures of the framework or tried to “collectively bargain” 
a decrease in trade deficit with China. However, the evidence of such collective 
behaviour is (still) not ample and their effects perhaps not as encompassing for the 
region as a whole. Advocates of collective power on CEE-China axis might argue for 
smaller groups or more ad hoc coalitions of small states, which would typically have 
a narrower scope and more concrete agenda (Eurasian intercontinental railway, 
Thessaloniki-Budapest railway modernisation and other joint cooperation projects). 
Holding a group of 17 disparate countries together as a source of collective power 
might be challenging, mainly because it represents a cluster of countries that has little 
experience in building and maintaining a consensus over issues in relations with the 
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order to supplement insufficient soft power projection.2  The 
interests of small states, not being constrained with ideational 
factors that otherwise consolidate asymmetric relations with 
other big (hegemonic) powers, tend to augment derivative 
power to diminish asymmetry in their relations with China.  
SCC is an example to help illustrate how this form of power 
matters to small states. Being the newest EU member country, 
sharing ex-Yugoslav political capital3 and belonging to Chinese 
defined CEE region (under 17+1 framework) represent Croatian 
resources that constitute a base of derivative power. Without any 
significant feature in SCC predating the ‘diamond stage’, these 
derivative relations can thus be considered as the main reason 
for China to engage in changing of asymmetric relationship 
with Croatia. Given these facts, Croatian derivative power offers 
the possibility of amplifying Croatia’s influence in SCC through 
the prism of its relations with(in) the SEE and CEE and in lieu 
of the influence of Croatia as a small state within the EU. To 
this end, Croatia and China have taken the course of action to 
strengthen SCC and Croatian position in Chinese FP initiatives. 
Constructivist perspective highlighting agendas and 
discourses as avenues to influence the decrease of bilateral 
(power) asymmetry is particularly relevant in Chinese attempt 
as a big power to maintain intrinsic power asymmetry while 
developing means to deemphasise structural gaps in projecting 
its soft power (see, e.g., Björkdahl 2008; Jakobsen 2009; Kronsell 
2002). China developed a systematic and comprehensive 
approach seeking, on a bilateral level, historical narratives, 
political rhetoric and a “soft” agenda in support of a more 
symmetric engagement with countries that have previously 
been out of its FP reach. Similarly, with the approach to bilateral 
“warming up” with other CEE countries, China considered 
challenges ranging from filling up a structural “void”4 in 
people-to-people relations to the necessity of allocating 
material means to decrease asymmetry or addressing repeated 
accusations branding China as an antagonising power to the 
2 Scholarship on Chinese soft power is abundant, without going into extents to which 
Chinese “soft power” has been elaborated, it suffices to state a referential study on 
Chinese “soft power” approaches towards CEE region, such as Soft Power: China’s 
Emerging Strategy in International Politics, ed. Mingjiang Li, Lexington books 2009.
3 For Yugoslav political capital and ‘crypto-Yugoslav’ perception of SEE region within 
Chinese FP conceptualisation, see Bai Yiwei, 2019, Qiannan Diqu Shehui Zhuanxin, Beijing: 
Shehui Wenti Yanjiu Chubanshe.
4 For “zhenkong”, see: Weiqing Song (ed), 2017, From old comrades to new partners - China` s 
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Euro-Atlantic commitments of the countries in CEE region 
(Taylor 2009: 64). In an effort to appease and balance back 
these concerns, one of the strategies adhered to is that of 
shaping a framework aiming at “familiarising” China and its 
cooperation with CEE countries through a planned approach 
for warming up the bilateral relations. This narrative strategy 
can be in general subsumed to a “charm offensive” Chinese 
policy-makers built up following the “globalisation of Chinese 
FP” (see, e.g., Shambaugh 2015). Notwithstanding geopolitical 
concerns on the antagonising role of Chinese engagement in 
CEE, which in the recent years have been extensively tackled 
from various standpoints5, we would simply like to focus on SCC 
as an example of the small state’s use of its derivative powers to 
decrease power asymmetry in bilateral relations with the big 
power. In order to do so, particularly relevant for a comparative 
outlook is not only the opening of the “diamond stage” of SCC 
or intensification of bilateral relations that predated Croatian 
PM Plenković’s visit to China in 2018 and a reciprocal state visit 
of Li Keqiang and Croatian hosting of the 16+1 Summit in 2019 
but a “pre-diamond” stage of SCC as well.
Pre-diamond relations between Croatia and China
The tumultuous period following the fall of the Berlin 
wall and dissolution of Yugoslavia brought a temporary 
halt in bilateral exchanges and erased structural means to 
conduct relations between Croatia and China. The break-up of 
Yugoslavia happened during the specific period in the history 
of Chinese foreign relations. China was more oriented towards 
the preservation of internal stability, and its “unassuming” 
foreign policy started to disengage from active participation 
in global affairs (Niu 2008: 232-254). However, only a few months 
after the UN recognised Croatia, China expressed its willingness 
to recognise newly independent ex-Yugoslav states, Croatia and 
Slovenia. Among diplomatic circles in Croatia it was argued 
that China might take more precautious steps in recognising 
the changing political reality in Eastern Europe, along with its 
determination to persevere political stability and economic 
growth (Baković 2005: 147-156). Nevertheless, the first diplomatic 
5 For example, Duchâtel, M., Godement, F., Liik, K., Shapiro, J., Slavkova, L., Stanzel, A. & 
Tcherneva, V., 2016. Eurasian integration: Caught between Russia and China, European 
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) Essay, 7 June. Available at http://www.ecfr.eu/
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contacts with Chinese diplomats in the UN showed that China 
“accepted the reality” and swiftly adapted to a new ‘post-
Yugoslav’ situation. It also defied “rooted prejudice” (Baković 
2005: 151-153) among some Croatian decision-makers that 
China along with Russia might show geopolitical inclinations 
to ‘Yugo-persevering’ political actors and that China will openly 
side with a (the) rump (Federal Republic of) Yugoslavia on the 
international stage.  
On 27 April 27 1992, China recognised Croatia, and diplomatic 
relations were formally established on 13 May 1992. In 1993, 
only a year after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the 
first Croatian president, Franjo Tuđman, paid a visit to Beijing, 
which is nowadays acclaimed as a far-sighted recognition of the 
importance of maintaining and advancing bilateral relations 
with China. It is especially so because relations with China 
have not been prioritised in the new diplomatic courses of the 
post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe while recurring war 
in Croatia only augmented audacity of his visit (Jandroković, 
Večernji list 2018). Tuđman’s visit has also incited change in 
perception of Chinese international role within Croatian 
foreign political decision-making level, which renounced zero-
sum thinking on Chinese involvement in the post-Yugoslav 
political situation. The visit has also helped to set out the “new 
type of relationship with a major country”, emphasising mutual 
respect, non-conflict, non-interference and cooperation based 
on mutual benefit. Along with several bilateral agreements on 
educational, cultural, trade and economic cooperation, Croatia 
started bilateral relations with China ‘in a new framework but 
keeping the spirit of the previous track of cooperation’.6 
However, under direct war threat and the pressure to complete 
transition from socialism, in the years after Tuđman’s visit, 
bilateral relations stagnated with weak growth in trade. 
Political transition that occurred in Croatia after Tuđman’s 
death in 2000 determined Croatian foreign policy to pursue the 
EU integration more actively, which along with joining NATO 
became dominant FP goal during the next 15 years. After a long 
period of accession negotiations with the EU, it can be argued 
that Croatian foreign policy has lost the acumen to pursue an 
independent foreign policy with major non-Western countries. 
It might be claimed that Euro-Atlantic integrations to a certain 
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extent eroded the capacity to pursue an independent foreign 
policy with non-Western countries and that Croatian FP to a 
certain extent “de-internationalised”, i.e. reduced the ability 
for conducting comprehensive (economic, political, social) 
relations with non-Western countries.
Beyond Croatian foreign policy towards the WB region and 
bandwagoning with the EU regarding the Russian policy, the 
pace of “internationalisation” of the Croatian foreign policy was 
languid and vacillating. As a general tendency, it also included 
some ‘progressive’ actors within Croatian diplomacy advocating 
a various set of policies, ranging from the pragmatic redefinition 
of the Russian policy, pursuing closer relations with the non-
aligned world (NAM), a more substantial presence in the UN fora, 
to ‘specialisation’ in some of the international issues as a way of 
getting into contact with the non-Western world. 
Within this tendency, the second Croatian President Stjepan 
Mesić during his second term (2005-2010) tended to show 
business-minded engagement reminiscent of the relations 
established during the Yugoslav period. This derivative 
approach made him pay more attention to the trade relations 
with the CIS and Arabic countries as well as China. One of the 
indirect outcomes was the start of decreasing asymmetry 
in SCC. In 2005, China and Croatia signed a Joint Statement 
on the establishment of a comprehensive and cooperative 
partnership.7 During 2005-2009 period, Croatian export to 
China has increased by more than 20% per year, while Chinese 
export to Croatia in 2008 almost doubled 2000 figure. Trade 
(im)balance was expectedly high, exceeding 2.3%; yet, until the 
recession hit the Croatian economy in 2009, Croatian export to 
China continued to maintain two-digit growth.8 
In 2009, the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Zagreb 
was the next step in advancing the bilateral cooperation. 
With extending agreements on educational, cultural and 
trade cooperation, Sino-Croatian relations were regarded as 
a successful model for the development of bilateral relations 
with the European country. However, in the same year, Croatia 
encountered delays in its EU integration caused by standing 
territorial dispute with Slovenia and was hit by the economic 
7 Chinese Embassy in Croatia. Available at: http://hr.china-embassy.org/eng/zkgx/gxgk/  
[accessed 1 October 2019].
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recession, which all diverted attention to more immediate 
concerns in its foreign policy. The advent of the Chinese 
foreign policy initiatives in the region, i.e. launching of the 
16+1 cooperation framework in 2012, caught Croatia off guard, 
and the country mostly lagged behind the regional countries in 
making an active response to Chinese cooperation initiatives 
(Kong, Wei 2017a: 18-20).
Croatia in the first years of Chinese FP initiatives towards the 
CEE Region
With the launch of the 16+1 cooperation framework (16+1),9 
Chinese key foreign policy initiative towards the sixteen 
countries of Central Eastern Europe, Chinese economic 
presence and the involvement in the region slowly started to 
get attention in Croatia, gradually appearing concurrent to 
other global and regional powers. Following the same pattern 
with all regional countries, China’s relations with Croatia 
initially focused on trade relations, becoming one of the top 
ten trade partners by 2013.10 With the development of economic 
cooperation, Chinese political involvement in the Western 
Balkans and Croatia became the topic that slowly started to 
make the headlines in the local media, if not coming on charts 
of foreign policy experts and political analysts. 
Even though the 16+1 cooperation was recognised as a platform 
to enhance the bilateral cooperation between Croatia and 
China, also giving Croatia the opportunity to coordinate its 
trade and investment potentials vis-à-vis China, Croatian 
FP capacity to be engaged in China-sponsored cooperation 
framework in the first five years was limited and Croatia has 
not managed to benefit much from this cooperation platform.11 
Comparatively speaking, Chinese economic presence was more 
tangible in the immediate Croatian neighbourhood. In terms 
9 Following the 2019 Dubrovnik Summit and Greece official ‘entry’ to this cooperation 
framework, “16+1” changed name into “17+1”. To avoid confusion when referring to pre-
2019 “history” of the framework, both “16+1” and “17+1” will be used interchangeably.
10 For details, see Hrvatska gospodarska komora (Croatian Chamber of Commerce), Export 
analysis. Available at: https://www.hgk.hr/odjel-za-poslovne-informacije/analize-i-
publikacije [accessed 10 December 2018].
11 For a brief outline of 16+1 cooperation, see The State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China (28 March 2015). “Chronology of China’s Belt and Road Initiative”. Available 
at: <http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/04/20/content_281475092566326.htm> 
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of inbound FDI and participation in China-bound initiatives, 
Serbia clearly outperformed other countries in the region. In the 
2014-2017 period, Chinese FDI to Serbia continuously exceeded 
total inward FDI amount to all other regional countries (Liu 
Zuokui 2016c: 81-102). Also, Serbian diplomatic efforts brought 
the organisation of the third 16+1 Summit in Belgrade, frequent 
high-level visits and signing several cooperation protocols 
including the comprehensive strategic partnership in 2016. 
In the 2014-2016 period, countries like Montenegro, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Macedonia have also started to receive 
Chinese investment, mainly in infrastructure and energy 
sector. Countries like Croatia belonged to a group of ‘cooperation 
laggards’ where initial enthusiasm for cooperation diminished 
into inevitable fatigue and created “cooperation vacuum” (Long 
Jing 2016: 120-125) between the expected and achieved level of 
cooperation. 
The reasons for a delayed response to the 16+1 cooperation 
initiative can generally be attributed to the inexperience in 
dealing with China, and the focus on the inter-communitarian 
relations after Croatia joined the EU in 2013. Indeed, it can be 
said that the EU accession ‘overwhelmed’ Croatian diplomacy, 
which grappled with attaining economic and political 
familiarity with inter-communitarian and common (external) 
foreign policy. Croatia learned to be more responsive to common 
foreign and security policy of the Union and over the past five 
years gradually increased diplomatic engagement within the 
institutions of the EU. These efforts initially created certain 
complacency towards the CFSP, which could be translated into 
“pre-emptive obedience” regarding the external foreign policy 
(Godement 2014: 34-62) and reflected on Chinese FP initiatives 
in the region. 
Secondly, as a country trying to disengage from its immediate 
region or, as it was suggested through narratives emphasising 
persistent anti-Yugoslavism in country’s FP, as being a “country 
without the region”, Croatian foreign policy was inclined to 
pursue more “hard-line” Euro-integrationism. Notwithstanding 
some initial hiccups and later regional initiatives, first years in 
the post-accession period aligned Croatia more off the CEE block 
as well as reconfirmed its adherence for a stable and monolithic 
CFSP, which as a backdrop has neglected all non-EU sponsored 
regional cooperation frameworks. Thirdly, Chinese FP 
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Croatia and Serbia during the Milanović-led SDP government. 
The migrant crisis in 2015 precipitated Croatia to seal off 
borders for Serbian goods temporarily, several ‘spy affairs’ 
and verbalisation of nationalist tensions between Zagreb and 
Belgrade all occurred only months before the 16+1 Belgrade 
Summit in 2015. These facts along with “disinterestedness” and 
some suspicions Milanović’s government harboured towards 
Chinese initiatives are the reason why Croatia was one of rare 
CEE countries not being represented by the prime minister on 
the Belgrade Summit.12 The fourth and maybe predominant 
reason for delayed cooperation between Croatia and China 
along the 16+1 framework is the lack of the experience in 
dealing with Chinese FP initiatives and the overall lack of 
capacity to conduct comprehensive and engaging policies 
with an asymmetric partner such as China. Put differently, 
asymmetries in material power and the lack of structural 
means to decrease bilateral asymmetry between China and 
Croatia still somewhat overwhelmed the derivative powers of 
Croatia.  
Features of Sino-Croatian relations at ‘the New Stage’ 
A new HDZ government led by the Croatian MEP and career-
diplomat Andrej Plenković in fact indicated a change in 
Croatian EU policy, reflected not in changing course (which was 
still a strict adherence to CFSP, especially regarding external 
policy), but in the effects of structures not directional to SCC, 
inciting agents to alter structural asymmetry with the big 
powers. How then this bilateral “push” happened, despite 
unchanging course in Croatian diplomacy, is a question for 
which mere convergence in FP may provide an answer. 
Convergence in FP regarding international arbitration 
over bilateral disputes was Croatian small state structural 
positionality that offered distinctive advantage vis-à-vis China. 
HDZ government objected The Hague Arbitration Court decision 
over the South China Sea in 2016 which not only reflected 
concerns for the implications on the ongoing territorial dispute 
with Slovenia over Piran Bay demarcation dispute but shared 
with China genuine unease about the binding power of the 
12 For a more detailed analysis on Croatian “China policy” on the advent of Chinese 
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arbitration ruling over the final bilateral settlement. Long-
standing territorial dispute with Slovenia had been settled for 
arbitration, however, after the affair with Slovenian politicians 
trying to influence arbitration court, Croatia unilaterally 
decided to withdraw from the arbitration procedures and despite 
Slovenian protests decided to adhere to bilateral negotiations. 
Plenković’s government assumed more “sovereignist” stance 
regarding the dispute and asserted bilateral negotiations as the 
only way to solve the dispute. Croatian diplomats were actively 
engaged in blocking European (EP, EC) joint statements and 
communiqués that could presume “arbitration as a solution 
to territorial disputes” in official EU documents, and later 
“blocked” declarations made by the EU institutions implying 
positions over the South China Sea. This convergence in 
Croatian and Chinese FPs regarding sovereignist approach in 
territorial disputes was a convenient excuse for the diplomatic 
rapprochement of two countries when Plenković assumed the 
office. Extending Barnett and Duvall’s concept, Croatian FP 
convergence in this field emphasised derivative power rooted 
in structural, not compulsory, aspects in ways that made their 
cooperation valuable through relational means, making China 
offset bilateral asymmetry in favour of Croatia. 
Here, it is also pertinent to switch to Chinese conceptual 
models in IR, when explaining “Chinese interests” in inciting 
this rapprochement with Croatia. Relational power, a concept 
considered as an original contribution of Chinese IR theory, is 
particularly relevant when explaining asymmetric or “non-
reciprocal” interactions between the small and big power. Lin, 
for example, argues for ideational sources such as face (mianzi) 
and prestige to be as crucial for Chinese rapprochement with 
Croatia without symmetric material returns expected in return 
(Lin 2001: 153-66). Placing more emphasis on non-material 
and intangible elements of “disinterested” international 
support or engaged FP convergence in exchange for expected 
material gains might be a good starting point to tackle this 
rapprochement, or even entire SCC, from more Sino-centric 
perspective of relationality. However, how much Croatian 
and Chinese FP decision-makers were aware of the bilateral 
potential this FP convergence might bring about and, more 
importantly, how much they agreed upon in ‘measuring’ 
(non-) reciprocity of decreasing bilateral asymmetry might 
pose an epistemological challenge. For our text, it suffices 
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potentials as they were and started a course of actions that 
led to rapprochement. Enhancing SCC has become one of the 
diplomatic efforts towards CEE countries that will lead up to 
a decrease in asymmetry and repositioning its role within 
Chinese regional FP initiative (16+1).  Some of the features that 
led to this appreciation of Croatia’s derivative power are as 
follows:
Pelješac Bridge construction project unmistakably represents 
a significant breakthrough in SCC that would be later depicted 
as a successful model for Chinese cooperation with the 
EU countries. In June 2017, the European Commission (EC) 
approved funding for the Pelješac Bridge construction project 
that will connect Dubrovnik exclave with the Croatian main A1 
highway through the Croatian territory, avoiding the existing 
route through Neum, a small strip of land belonging to non-
EU Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soon after the EC “gave a green 
light” for the project, deciding to allocate 357 million EUR from 
cohesion policy fund, China Road and Bridge Corporation 
(CRBC) won a contract. In explaining the decision, the Croatian 
side cited the most favourable offer (2.08 billion HRK) and 
“excellent references” (Donghai Bridge, Hangzhou Bay Bridge) 
given by CRBC. In April 2018, the contract with CRBC was signed, 
and in September 2018 the project officially started. 
It is the biggest construction project undertaken by a Chinese 
company in Croatia (estimated value is 357 million EUR; 
completion is expected in 2021). Moreover, it is also an example 
of the small state’s ability to enhance cooperation models of 
the big power, using derivative powers to found niches in the 
global economy and allowing asymmetric interdependence to 
create avenues for influence (Katzenstein 1985, 21–30). As the 
first infrastructure project financed by the EC and contracted 
by the Chinese state-owned company, it benchmarked a new 
preferable cooperation model with the EU that China seems 
to accomplish. On the one hand, for Chinese construction 
companies it provided access to protective EU market; on the 
other, it is a step ahead from highly criticised state-driven 
investment and concessional loan based cooperation models, 
which already forced China to allocate intrinsic capacities to 
decrease power asymmetry (Duchatel 2016: 87). A cooperation 
model provided by Pelješac Bridge construction project (PBP), 
therefore, served as an ‘EU-entry model’ concurrent to strategies 
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on the low-yielding Chinese market. Lobbying and internal 
reasons of the Croatian part to award the contract to the Chinese 
company as well as the “pre-arranged” negotiations of Croatian 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Transport and Infrastructure 
with CRBC representatives in 2017 were – unfortunately – 
only rumoured in Croatian media.13 Nevertheless, the speed 
and expediency through which both sides recognised “mutual 
benefits” of the PBP project, encourages to assume ongoing 
diplomatic activities behind closed doors or at least, for our 
concern, persuading or convincing actions on Croatian part 
to use its EU membership and CEE “identity” to help mould 
preferable cooperation model for China’s relations with the 
European countries. The PBP project can be regarded as an 
example of using derivative powers without expecting direct 
material quid pro ideational quo (EU already financed project); 
instead, it significantly decreased bilateral asymmetry by 
initiating a favour to the big power and thus increasing its 
chances for reciprocal transaction in terms of the later material 
payoffs.  
After providing a viable ‘EU-entry model’ for China, SCC 
started to gain new momentum. Sino-Croatian bilateral 
interactions doubled and the contacts between the officials 
and diplomats of the two countries in the period after 2016 
were also characterised by a higher mutual consent regarding 
the economic cooperation. Unlike the previous period, these 
contacts aspired more than to have a formal exchange of ideas 
and were more project-oriented. Croatian part has initiated 
several investment projects and opportunities in the transport 
and construction sector, including the modernisation 
of Croatian railroad network, acquisition or investment 
in Croatian ports and airports. Zagreb-Rijeka railway 
modernisation project was considered a ‘second avenue’ for 
Chinese entry into the Croatian infrastructure sector. This long-
standing project was offered financial support ranging from 
“Beijing package” (concessional loan, financing & contracting 
by Chinese banks and companies) to model similar to the 
PBP project. However, required state guarantees that would 
dangerously increase Croatian public debt in the first case, and 
the rejection of the project by the EC coupled with increased 
13  See, for example, Pajić, D., 2018, “Pelješki most će graditi Kinezi ili će natječaj biti 
poništen”, Novi list, 15 January 2018, Available at:http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/
Hrvatska/ODLUKA-DO-15.-SIJECNJA-Peljeski-most-ce-graditi-Kinezi-ili-ce-natjecaj-biti-
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suspicions from Brussels on Chinese investments in the CEE 
region in the second, temporarily halted negotiation process 
on the bilateral level.14 Nevertheless, the Croatian government 
succeeded in gaining experience in results-driven negotiations 
with China, triangulating the primary source of its derivative 
power in the dialogue (EU).
In 2017, when Croatia started with a more active dialogue with 
Chinese investment and cooperation partners, it was proposed 
that Croatia could serve as a hub destination for region bound 
tourists. Already in this phase, the Croatian government 
tried to pace up cooperation in the field deemed as its ‘niche’, 
building closer relations with Chinese tour operators and 
facilitating regional-level tourist cooperation. To get more 
say in these processes, Croatia proposed to be in charge of 
tourist cooperation promotion and facilitation network under 
the 16+1 cooperation framework. In parallel, the Croatian 
Ministry of Tourism adopted the new strategic plan, under 
which Croatian institutions in charge of tourist promotion 
should more actively work in attracting tourists from Asian 
markets. The plan was expanded in order to incorporate 
the administrative component along with the promotional 
activities, and it served as one of the good examples of the 
successful cooperation-seeking platforms on a bilateral and 
multilateral level. The administrative component included 
establishing the Representative Office of Croatian Tourist Board 
in China, which was realised during the visit of PM Plenković 
to China in November 2018 and facilitating visa procedures 
for Chinese tourists. Representative Office of Croatian Tourist 
Board, opened in Shanghai in 2018, is the third office in Asia 
(after Tokyo and Seoul). 
In a particularly positive development of SCC, Croatia became 
responsive to further advance SCC with focus on economic 
cooperation and investment opportunities. The ideas and 
plans that the Croatian part was proposed in bilateral talks 
with Chinese counterparts included “more material” reciprocal 
transactions, such as the establishment of the (Renminbi based) 
international settlement bank; cooperation in the construction 
sector (besides the aforementioned modernisation of 
14 For details, see: Opet svi govore o nizinskoj pruzi, Tportal, 4 April 2019, Available at: 
https://www.tportal.hr/biznis/clanak/opet-svi-govore-o-nizinskoj-pruzi-ovih-10-
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Rijeka-Zagreb railway network, modernisation of overall 
Croatian railway infrastructure, seaports and airports); 
tourism and people-to-people exchanges and the importance of 
building stronger links with Chinese outbound tourist market. 
Among these proposals, worth mentioning are building the 
National Stadium in Zagreb and plans for the restructuring of 
Croatian shipbuilding industry. As an idea, the building of the 
National Stadium resurrected following the success of Croatian 
football representation on the 2018 World Cup and coincided 
with Chinese national plans to modernise its sports industry. 
Moreover, specific “popular soft power” Croatia suddenly 
gained in China almost eclipsed aforementioned “official” 
sources of derivative power it relied upon. Chinese leaders 
were willing to discuss sports cooperation and investment 
in sports infrastructure. The solution for the participation of 
Chinese companies in building, contracting or fully financing 
the National Stadium project was raised. However, due to 
divided public opinion regarding the National Stadium project, 
objections on expenditures as well as the missed opportunity 
to fully assess cooperation potentials brought by the silver 
medal in Russia were to be blamed for the project remaining 
only on MOU level. 
Investment in the Croatian shipbuilding industry and 
restructuring of Uljanik shipyard was more clearly considered 
as a material payoff, at least in Croatian media. Following the 
2019 16+1 Summit, PM Plenković was said to had personally 
asked PM Li to see if Chinese side could be interested in plans for 
rescuing Uljanik shipyard. It was a “hot potato” for the Croatian 
government, especially after the EU rejected to participate 
in restructuring plans, leaving the current government to 
wander in finding private partners. However, after months of 
screening, Chinese partners decided in late 2019 not to enter 
into this overly complex and politicised matter in Croatia.
Solely the hosting of the 2019 16+1 Summit can be understood 
as the proper evidence of decreasing bilateral asymmetry by 
providing the relatively reciprocal transaction. Hosting this 
Summit was usually only given to countries having close 
cooperation with China or otherwise being important by their 
sheer size and influence. Looking into the dynamics of the 16 
– 1 interaction from a Chinese perspective, therefore, Croatian 
prestige and mianzi it gave to China coupled with derivative 
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reasons to ‘push up’ SCC on a highly hierarchical list of bilateral 
interactions with the 16 countries. It could be said that the 
diamond stage in SCC arrived by skipping due ‘golden stage’ in 
otherwise systematic, gradual and hierarchic (e.g., Lajčák 2017: 
9-27) Chinese diplomatic interaction with the world. 
The idea for his visit to China “came up” on the 16+1 Summit 
in July 2018. It was initially intended to prepare Croatia for 
hosting 16+1 Summit, expand bilateral economic cooperation 
and help Croatia to be “put on the map” of Chinese FP initiatives. 
With evolving preparation for the visit, the Croatian side 
positively and timely responded to Chinese agenda-setting; 
as a result, Croatian PM arrived together with two ministers 
(economy, entrepreneurship) and both countries` business 
representatives. Croatian media have also reported about an 
“important Chinese forum that will be attended by Croatia”, 
breaking with low-level attention regarding SCC.15  
Until December 2018, several preparatory meetings for the 16+1 
Summit were held in Croatia. In September 2018, ministerial-
level delegations met in Dubrovnik to discuss cooperation in 
tourism. A significant moment was the 5-day visit of Prime 
Minister Plenković to China in November 2018. The purpose 
of the visit was to, among others, hold preliminary talks 
with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on the organisation of the 
16+1 Summit, discuss in more detail tourist cooperation and 
perspectives on Sino-Croatian cooperation. Croatian PM 
headed Croatian delegation of ministers and businesspeople 
that attended the China Import Investment Expo in Shanghai 
and had separate meetings with CRBC Chairman and Asian 
Investment Bank Director.
The 2019 16+1 Summit in Dubrovnik was advertised as a 
significant diplomatic success of the current government and, 
according to some media reports, ‘as the single most important 
diplomatic event’ in the year. Departing from a low-profile 
stance regarding China and China-related news, Croatian media 
extensively covered Croatian tour of the Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang, bilateral talks he had with PM Plenković and President 
Grabar-Kitarović, the visit of Pelješac Bridge construction site 
and the 16+1 Summit proceedings. 
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From the bilateral perspective, the Summit was an opportunity 
to sign several MOUs in the field of railway transportation, 
tourism & sports exchanges and infrastructure development 
and incite growing attention of the Croatian public for China 
and Chinese diplomatic initiatives.
Concluding remarks - challenges for SCC in the ‘Diamond Stage’ 
In order to sum up decreased asymmetry in SCC incited 
by a “diamond stage” of bilateral relations, it can be said that 
bilateral relations went from distant to closer - or more bluntly 
- from void to eventful. Understanding the base of derivative 
power as a constitutive relationship between the small state and 
the big power, Croatian relations within the EU and its position 
within CEE formed a source of power that moulded asymmetric 
model for cooperation with China. The FP convergence with 
China and cooperation on Pelješac Bridge project allowed 
upgrading the Croatian level of engagement with this big 
power. During bilateral interaction leading to the ‘diamond 
stage’ in SCC, Croatia has shown to have capacity and skills to 
decrease bilateral asymmetry with the big power significantly. 
It used its derivative powers in initiating a favour to China and 
creating avenues for influencing a stronger bilateral partner, 
even increasing its chances for reciprocal transaction in terms 
of the later material payoffs. Whether Croatia will follow quid 
pro quo logic or wisely wait to cash in the fruits of its derivative 
potentials with China remains to be seen. Indeed, the ‘diamond 
stage’ in SCC at this stage provides a new form of bilateral 
relationship for Croatia, deifying orthodox approaches in the 
understanding of the small-big power interaction in IR that are 
usually dominant in conceptualising Croatian relations with 
other big powers. 
Nevertheless, these orthodox approaches might pose 
conceptual challenges, since, one can argue, Croatia does not 
seem to have many comparative, material advantages or strong 
structural links to continue with decreasing asymmetric 
bilateral relations with China. In assessing the base of 
Croatian derivative power to sustain the Chinese attempt to 
the decreased asymmetry of SCC, three main challenges should 
be added. First, as it was mentioned, the Croatian government 
is pursuing “hard-line” Euro-integrationism and shows high 
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This attitude was emphasised in the relations with Russia, 
regarding Agrokor affair and Russian economic advances 
toward Croatia. Therefore, the relations with China have not 
(yet) received due prioritisation in Croatian “extra-EU” FP, in 
the same level as it is a case in Hungary or Czechia. As much as 
domestic FP professionals see the current extent of involvement 
between China with some CEE countries as a path Croatia 
has the capacity to follow, individual risk-averse thinking 
regarding general implications it might have on CFSP - which, 
in the extreme case, could unnecessary drag Croatia into EU 
internal “block divisions”- as well as inexperience in dealing 
with China, represent the main reasons why current Croatian 
leadership might still hold reservations about undigested 
initiatives and proposals for the deepening of SCC. Pelješac 
Bridge project cooperation is the finest example of Croatian 
ability to start a change of Chinese cooperation model with the 
CEE. However, it should also be regarded as a result that had a 
positive outcome on SCC only after all conflicting structural 
(geo-economic) implications have been ruled out. Second, 
catching up with China is a long way from taking the lead in 
relations with China. Plenković’s government inherited a rather 
passive and ignorant stance towards SCC, so the ‘diamond stage’ 
is still far from overreaching strategy towards China. Indeed, 
Croatian vision of SCC has limited scope and is still struggling 
to uphold a comprehensive, long-term platform. Therefore, 
Croatia is expected to take rather timid steps in proposing new 
ideas and initiatives and be more receptive for Chinese vision 
for the development of SCC. 
Croatia might hope that China will recognise the advantage 
Croatian leadership has in pursuing consistent CFSP, pro-
integrationism and unity over essential questions regarding 
the future of the EU as well as the fact that these issues will give 
Croatia more say in further modelling the EU stance over the 
16+1 and other Chinese FP initiatives. Ultimately, it could show 
the way towards the diamond-shaped (a)symmetry in bilateral 
relations with China.
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